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Abstract 
IT users often make information security-related decisions in complex and multidimensional 
environments, which could lead to phenomena like behavioral anomalies. For instance, under 
uncertain circumstances, users may discount their own limited information about a security 
technology and make their adoption decisions based on what the majority of users’ decisions are in 
this regard. In this context, imitation can become a legitimate and rational strategy for making 
security-related decisions. Current behavioral security theories generally assume that users possess 
sufficient information about security technologies before making security-related decisions. This 
theory assumption limits our understanding of how security decisions are made in various real-world 
circumstances. Our research is focused on security behaviors under uncertain circumstances. We 
investigate how providing popularity information can trigger herd behavior and can subsequently 
influence security behaviors. We also provide insights into security-related decisions that are 
influenced by herd mentality and investigate whether they persist over time. Additionally, we 
conceptualize and operationalize two constructs that can be used in future research to better examine 
post-adoption security behaviors. The findings of this multistage experiment show that in uncertain 
circumstances, when users are aware of the widespread use of a certain security technology, they 
develop a significantly higher intention to engage in protection-motivated behaviors. Furthermore, 
the results show that at the post-adoption stage, users rely more heavily on their own information 
about their continuous use of security technologies and put less emphasis on herd-related factors. 
Keywords: Herd Behavior, Uncertainty, Bounded Rationality, Imitation, Information Security, 
Protection Motivation, Continuance Intention. 
Richard Baskerville was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on May 20, 2018, and 
underwent three revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Information system (IS) security incidents and issues, 
such as insider threats, insidious malware, and system 
penetration, are increasingly prevalent every year 
(Ponemon, 2017). According to the Online Trust 
Alliance’s (OTA) latest report (2018), cyber incidents 
targeting businesses nearly doubled from 82,000 in 
2016 to nearly 160,000 in 2017, thus making 2017 the 
worst year yet for data breaches and cybersecurity 
attacks. Similarly, individuals face threats to the 
security of their personal information in the form of 
hard-drive failure, malware, social engineering, etc. 
How do these individuals determine the best approach 
to protect their information assets? 
The IS security literature suggests that to engage users 
in secure behavior, threats that inspire protection 
motivation must outweigh the maladaptive rewards 
earned by not engaging in protection motivation (Boss, 
et al., 2015, p. 843). Second, in the coping-appraisal 
stage, the users’ response efficacy (the perception that 
a security technology/action can be useful in protecting 
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against security threats) must outweigh the response 
costs in order for them to engage in secure behavior 
and evaluate whether they can successfully use the 
technology for protection (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010; Johnston, Warkentin & Siponen, 2015). One of 
the most prevalent assumptions in prior IS security 
studies has been the certainty and vigilance of users 
regarding security technologies. For example, 
Johnston & Warkentin (2010) state that: “in an end 
user’s contemplation of whether or not he or she will 
adopt [a security solution], he or she will consider the 
capabilities of the … solution and form a disposition 
… based on this appraisal” (p. 553). This appraisal is 
informed by perceptions of the technology’s efficacy 
and usability. But what if a user’s fear of a security 
threat is significantly high but there is also a high level 
of uncertainty about the capabilities and usability of 
the protective response? In uncertain circumstances, 
do users base their information security-related 
decisions on their limited personal assessments? In 
such circumstances, the sole reliance on the 
assumptions of current IS security theories may yield 
insufficient insight. We argue that to truly explain 
security decisions, one must seek a more nuanced 
theoretical understanding and empirical analysis than 
extant research has provided heretofore. 
Imperfect information, which can lead to uncertainty, 
is a major phenomenon that can “bound” an 
individual’s rationality (Simon, 1976). The term 
“bounded rationality” refers to situations in which the 
rationality of individuals in decision-making is usually 
limited by imperfect information, cognitive 
restrictions, and the amount of time available. 
Subsequently, the existence of uncertainty prevents the 
rational quantification of the probabilities of future 
events (Baddeley, 2011). In uncertain circumstances, 
herd mentality plays a highly influential role in 
predicting human behavior. According to herd theory, 
without a clear course to follow, it could be rational for 
an individual to observe the behavior of others, imitate 
what they do, and learn from the signals of others 
(Acemoglu, 1993; Wang, 2009; Wang, Li, & Rao, 
2017). This phenomenon is particularly important and 
influential in the age of the internet. Because of the 
popularity of IT-related innovations, it has become 
easy to observe other users’ decisions about 
technology acceptance or rejection. 
In the context of security behavior, users may have to 
make security-related decisions in a complex and 
multidimensional environment. Thus, the reliance on 
behavioral security theories grounded in deliberative 
rational decision processes that do not consider 
phenomena such as decision-making in uncertain 
circumstances could limit our understanding and lead 
to conflicting results in the literature. In fact, it is 
reasonable to argue that the precision of the predictions 
and explanation of users’ secure behavior could be 
improved if the circumstances under which they are 
likely to process potentially threatening information 
and make resulting decisions are carefully identified 
and controlled. Thus, our first research question is as 
follows: 
RQ1: In uncertain circumstances, to what extent are 
users more likely to cope with security threats 
by engaging in herd behavior? 
Furthermore, users must continue to engage in secure 
behaviors to maintain the security of their information 
(Warkentin, Johnston, et al., 2016). Users’ beliefs, 
attitudes, and appraisals are not static because when 
users experience (directly or vicariously) a security 
threat (e.g., data loss, computer virus, etc.), they tend 
to engage in improved security hygiene, but often only 
for a limited time (Vedadi & Warkentin, 2018; 
Mutchler & Warkentin, 2020). Therefore, 
understanding the impact of imitation on secure 
behavior over time is crucial. Thus, our second 
research question is: 
RQ2: To what extent does herd mentality influence 
users’ post-adoption security behaviors? 
This study contributes to the IS security literature by 
examining how obtaining popularity information about 
a security technology in uncertain circumstances can 
trigger herd mentality and subsequently affect security 
behaviors. We show that in such circumstances, users 
who receive popularity information may develop a 
higher level of protection motivation than those who 
do not. Another contribution of this study is that it 
provides insights into how security-related decisions 
that are influenced by herd mentality persist over time. 
Specifically, we examine whether and to what extent 
herd mentality and personal assessments influence 
users’ continuance intention at the post-adoption stage.  
In this regard, we also conceptualized and 
operationalized two constructs that could be used in 
future research to more accurately measure the 
antecedents of continuance intention at the post-
adoption stage. We show that users may modify their 
beliefs about security technologies at the post-adoption 
stage (based on new information and actual experience 
with a security technology) and that the influence of 
these modified beliefs on continuance behavior may be 
different from their influence on initial security 
behaviors. Our findings show support for most of our 
hypotheses. In addition, our findings enhance our 
understanding of the contextual circumstances in 
which users make security-related decisions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we 
briefly review the issue of bounded rationality in the IS 
security context and the role of high uncertainty in 
security-related decision-making. Next, we review the 
limited amount of literature on secure behavior 
continuance and the dynamics of herd behavior over 
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time. Based on these theoretical foundations, we 
develop our hypotheses and research model. Next, we 
describe our multistage experimental methods and 
their application to test the hypotheses. We then 
present our results. We conclude by discussing our 
findings and their theoretical and practical implications 
and then provide suggestions for future research. 
2 Bounded Rationality in Security 
Behaviors 
Bounded rationality occurs when the rationality of 
individual decision makers is limited by incomplete 
information, cognitive constraints, and/or time 
pressure. If individuals are boundedly rational, then the 
logical application of clear mathematical rules (e.g., 
utility maximization) is not possible because the 
existence of incalculable uncertainty prevents the 
quantification of the probabilities of future events 
(Simon, 1976). Conventional economic theories 
assume that individuals act as independent agents, but 
contemporary economic theories recognize that 
learning processes (e.g., social learning) are highly 
important when individuals are inclined to seek 
additional information before making decisions. 
Economics theorists have also proposed belief learning 
models that are focused on the processes through 
which individuals learn about the beliefs of their 
opponents (Baddeley, 2011). 
Herd behavior, which is also known as observational 
learning, has received growing attention in the IS 
literature (Li & Hitt, 2008; Tucker & Zhang, 2011; 
Yoo, Jeon, & Han, 2016; Dewan, Ho, & Ramaprasad, 
2017; Liu, Feng, & Liao, 2017; Wang, Zhang, & Hann, 
2018). Without a clear path to follow, which leads to 
high uncertainty, it could be rational to follow the 
crowd, that is, engage in imitation-based behavior and 
learn from the signals in the behavior of others 
(Acemoglu, 1993). Similarly, it could be argued that 
when information is sparse, individuals will do what 
others are doing because they assume that it is the 
rational choice. Accordingly, rational agents may be 
incentivized to follow the herd based on perceptions of 
their own lack of knowledge. Therefore, herd behavior 
is rational when individuals have reason to believe that 
other people’s judgments are based on better, more 
complete information than their own. Consequently, 
such individuals incorporate the behavior of others into 
their own set of prior information (Keynes, 1937). 
The primary implication of these arguments for 
security behaviors is that if users’ security-related 
behaviors are observed and identified, then other users 
will be highly likely to follow their lead. If the 
information about the adoption of the most effective IT 
safeguards by others is preeminent in the information 
provided, then this influence will encourage users to do 
what other users are doing, which could lead to the 
evolution of new social norms in making security-
related decisions. Because decisions about security 
behaviors are made in complex and multidimensional 
environments, they could be based on contradictory 
goals (e.g., choosing a facile but ineffective safeguard 
versus a complex, yet highly effective safeguard). 
Therefore, relying solely on behavioral security 
theories that do not account for insightful phenomena, 
such as decision-making in highly uncertain 
circumstances, herd behavior and any other factor that 
bounds users’ rationality can seriously limit the 
understanding of secure behaviors. The fact that the 
findings from many IS security behavior studies have 
not yielded consistent results is evidence of this 
shortcoming (Crossler et al., 2014). Hence, secure 
behavior could be better predicted and explained if the 
circumstances in which users were likely to process 
potentially threatening information and the potential 
responses were carefully identified and controlled. 
Furthermore, it is important to investigate the influence 
of the circumstances in which decisions are made (e.g., 
high uncertainty and herd behavior) on secure behavior 
over time. As mentioned earlier, the initial security-
related reactions of IT users to security threats and 
secure behavior are important, but the real value of 
these behaviors is dependent upon their continuous and 
sustained practice. Therefore, in the following section, 
we review the fundamentals of herd behavior and its 
influence on decision-making over time. 
3 Herd Behavior: Fundamentals 
and Dynamics 
In a wide range of social situations, people base their 
decisions on the behavior of the people around them. 
For instance, we usually decide to try a new restaurant 
based on its apparent popularity (Banerjee, 1992). 
Keynes (1937) suggested that investors in asset 
markets often make decisions based on observational 
learning. Similarly, in a study on fertility choices, it 
was found that such decisions (e.g., how many children 
to have) were substantially influenced by observing 
what other people do in the same geographic area 
(Baddeley, 2011). This phenomenon, known as herd 
behavior, also occurs in other contexts, such as 
citizens’ voting patterns, “hot” topics that researchers 
choose to investigate, online ratings, and 
crowdfunding (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017; 
Muchnik, Aral, & Taylor, 2013). 
In Banerjee’s (1992) model of herd behavior, agents 
capture all the returns generated by their choice so that 
there is no considerable distortion in incentives 
(Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Herd behavior involves 
both one’s own information and one’s observations of 
the actions of others. In some cases, all people make 
the same choice, which is unrealistic because not 
everyone completely disregards their own information 
in imitating others. People tend to depend on a 
combination of their own information and their 
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observations of the behavior of others. Thus, herd 
behavior is “observed but is somewhat less widespread 
than is predicted by the respective theories, with agents 
following their own signals more than the theory 
predicts” (Hey & Morone, 2004, p. 639). It has also 
been shown that financial agents often trade on the 
differences between their own information and that 
which is publicly available (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). 
At first glance, herd behavior may seem similar to the 
concept of social norms. Despite having some 
conceptual overlap, herd behavior is inherently 
different from subjective norms in several important 
ways.1 First, these two concepts differ in terms of the 
source of information leading to the focal individual’s 
actions, as pointed out by Sun (2013) and others. 
Subjective norms emanate from someone’s reference 
group, consisting of those important to them— 
“important others,” who are often a small group of 
known individuals, such as family members, co-
workers, or close friends, whereas the herd (popularity 
information) are typically unknown strangers. People 
in one’s reference group do not necessarily use the 
technology themselves, but they may express an 
opinion that reflects the social norm.  
On the other hand, herd behavior usually has a much 
more extensive information source, often comprising 
many prior users or a large user base of strangers. In 
addition, in the herd behavior context, an individual 
follows those predecessors who have already adopted 
the behavior or technology (Sun, 2013). When it comes 
to subjective norms, individuals expect that their 
adoption decision may later be judged by the reference 
group. They care how the use of a certain technology 
will influence their image in their personal social circle 
(Moore & Benbasat, 1991). But in the case of herd 
behavior, an individual receives popularity 
information about the value of a technology and tries 
to avoid costs or blame related to a bad choice. Such 
individuals do not care about how the people they 
follow judge them for using a certain technology. In 
fact, the members of the large anonymous herd will not 
know about their choices. In addition, herd behavior 
and subjective norms are different in terms of how 
information is acquired. Herd behavior relies on 
“observation” of other people’s behavior, whereas 
subjective norm usually hinges on messages received 
from significant others. (Triandis, 1980; Thompson, 
Higgins, & Howell, 1991).  
In the IS context, herd behavior can be described as the 
phenomenon of users following other users in adopting 
a technology, even when their private information 
suggests doing something different. According to Rao, 
Greve, and Davis (2001), studies on herd behavior 
 
1 Contrast these two situations: In one case, your friends urge 
you to switch to a mapping app they like. In another case, 
have focused on discrete decisions, such as whether to 
invest or not invest in a certain project or whether to 
adopt or to reject a technology. However, the decision 
to adopt or reject a technology typifies a situation that 
can lead to herd behavior. Duan, Gu, and Whinston 
(2009) found that internet users’ choices of software 
significantly fluctuated when the total number of 
downloads changed, indicating that users were likely 
to follow the previous adopters’ choices. They also 
found that users’ reliance on the total of number 
downloads may lead to choosing inferior technologies. 
According to Sun (2013), users may consider including 
both the observations of others and their own 
perceptions in making a decision to adopt a 
technology. First, the actions of other people may be 
considered less relevant. The behavior of other users 
usually conveys information that could differ from 
one’s own information. That many users have adopted 
a certain technology may signify that the technology is 
popular and useful. Furthermore, the user’s own 
information specifies how this technology meets his or 
her own needs. Second, the current users of a 
technology may send mixed signals (e.g., adoption or 
rejection signals), indicating their contrasting 
perspectives regarding the technology, which may 
cause users to question the value of the technology and 
use their own information. 
In this regard, to explain herd behavior in the context 
of technology adoption, Sun (2013) conceptualized 
and operationalized two new concepts: discounting 
[one’s] own information (DOI) (i.e., the degree to 
which one disregards his or her own beliefs about a 
technology in making an adoption decision) and 
imitation (i.e., the degree to which one follows the 
previous adopters of a certain technology). Sun also 
elaborated the conditions under which herd behavior 
occurs in the context of technology adoption, the ways 
in which such behavior influences decisions to adopt a 
technology, and its effects on its post-adoption usage. 
The findings of his longitudinal study suggested that 
discounting personal beliefs and imitating others when 
adopting a new technology are triggered mainly 
through observing prior adoptions and perceptions of 
high uncertainty regarding the adoption of new 
technology. Inconsistent with the herd literature in 
finance and economics, Sun (2013) found that 
imitation decreased post-adoption regret and therefore 
was a legitimate strategy for choosing a satisficing 
technology that might not necessarily be optimal. In 
exhibiting adherence to herd behavior, users are 
inclined to adjust their personal beliefs, and they might 
readjust their originally discounted beliefs at the post-
adoption stage (Sun, 2013). 
you see ratings (popularity information) of mapping apps on 
a website. 
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In another study that focused on understanding herd 
behavior in the early adoption of novel technologies 
and the dynamics of this phenomenon, Walden and 
Browne (2009) examined a model of observational 
learning to explain decisions to adopt a technology by 
simulating users’ behavior based on both their own 
information and the signals inferred by observing the 
behavior of others. One of their key findings was that 
IT herds that collectively select an effective 
technology are robust in the face of contrary 
information. Specifically, imitation does not 
necessarily help in adopting a technology that best fits 
the user’s needs and exceeds his or her expectations. 
Therefore, when the users in a herd receive a signal that 
indicates the existence of a better technology, the herd 
itself may not necessarily collapse. This phenomenon 
is inconsistent with the finance and economics 
literature, which claims that herds are fragile and 
extremely sensitive to contrary information. 
4 Research Model and Hypothesis 
Development 
Based on the previous discussion of bounded 
rationality in behavioral security and the relevant 
theoretical foundations, we propose the research model 
depicted in Figure 1. Consistent with the IS security 
literature (Liang & Xue, 2010), it is expected that 
beliefs regarding the protective capability of a certain 
security technology will increase in strength because 
the user perceives that a related IT security threat is 
more probable. In other words, when users admit that 
they are susceptible to an IT security threat, they are 
likely to engage in using a protective technology that 
is deemed effective. Furthermore, because a security 
threat is perceived to be severe and avoidable, a user 
will be more likely to adopt this IT security solution to 
address the threat. Finally, moderate to high levels of 
perceived response efficacy increase protection 
motivation with regard to the threat against which a 
security technology is targeted. Users will evaluate the 
capabilities of such a technology and form a 
disposition toward it (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010; Johnston, Warkentin & Siponen, 
2015; Liang & Xue, 2010). Based on these arguments, 
we argue that: 
H1: Perceptions of threat susceptibility positively 
influence perceptions of response efficacy. 
H2: Perceptions of threat severity positively influence 
perceptions of response efficacy. 
H3: Response efficacy positively influences the 
intention to use the information security solution.
 
Figure 1. The Proposed Research Model 
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In highly uncertain circumstances, users are less likely 
to adequately assess and understand the relationship 
between their adoption and the outcomes of that 
adoption. This response inhibits the accurate 
evaluation of the efficacy of a potential security 
software. Therefore, it is a legitimate strategy for users 
to follow other users’ decisions and, subsequently, to 
discount their limited information and beliefs, which 
they deem inadequate in making an effective adoption 
decision (Banerjee, 1992).  
Furthermore, when users discount their own 
information, they rely less on their initial information 
and beliefs than on the insights obtained from their 
observations of others’ behavior. Logically, the more a 
user discounts his or her own information, the more 
likely he or she will be to imitate the behavior of others 
(Banerjee, 1992). Discounting one’s own information 
can increase the likelihood of users’ imitating the 
actions of others instead of making a decision based 
solely on their own information/beliefs because as one 
reduces the use of one’s own information and opinions, 
where else is there to turn except to the actions of 
others? In circumstances in which a user discounts his 
or her own opinion, a reasonable strategy is to imitate 
the actions of others (Au & Kaufmann, 2003; Thies et 
al. 2016). We argue that uncertainty alone does not 
necessarily lead to imitation because in some cases, the 
level of uncertainty can be too high, thereby paralyzing 
the decision-making process. Additionally, being 
uncertain, without being aware of the herd direction 
(i.e., receiving no popularity information), users might 
simply prefer the status quo, regardless of their strong 
perceptions of an information security threat. The 
nonsignificant relationship between perceived 
uncertainty and imitation, as empirically demonstrated 
by Sun (2013), confirms this claim. Therefore, we 
argue that in uncertain circumstances, imitation 
becomes an authentic alternative strategy based on 
discounting one’s own information because users may 
believe that others have better and more complete 
information regarding that security technology. Thus, 
we propose the following hypotheses: 
H4: Uncertainty about using a security technology is 
positively associated with users’ discounting their 
own information. 
H5: Discounting one’s own information increases the 
tendency of users to imitate the behavior of other 
users. 
According to herd theory, discounting one’s own 
information means that users rely less on their own 
beliefs in making technology adoption decisions. Thus, 
it is reasonable to argue that the more that users 
discount their own information, the less important that 
personal beliefs are in making decisions, 
demonstrating a weak anchoring effect of beliefs (Sun, 
2013). Therefore, discounting one’s own information 
can negatively moderate the relationship between 
perceived response efficacy and adoption of a security 
technology. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H6: Discounting one’s own information 
negatively moderates the relationship 
between response efficacy and behavioral 
intention to engage in protection-
motivated behaviors. 
In the finance and economics literature, there is 
sufficient evidence that many investors mimic the 
investment decisions of other investment managers to 
avoid being considered incompetent in the case of a 
poor return on investment (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). 
Generally, individuals may prefer the odds of being 
wrong along with everybody else to the risk of 
providing an atypical prediction that is the only 
incorrect forecast (Graham, 1999). Similarly, in the 
information security context, the act of imitation 
indicates that even when a security technology that is 
adopted by a herd is inefficient, this situation is more 
acceptable than the circumstance in which a user is the 
only one who makes the wrong decision not to adopt 
an efficient IT security technology and then suffers 
reputational damage. Additionally, the issues of 
information asymmetry and information imperfection 
are pervasive in the IS context (Liu et al., 2017). 
Decision makers might make judgments about the 
value of an emerging technology based on their own 
information. For example, it has been found that a large 
number of positive reviews for an app encourages 
further adoption (Keith et al., 2016). Therefore, we 
hypothesize the following: 
H7: Imitating others is positively associated with a 
user’s intention to use an information security 
solution to protect against a security threat. 
Drawing on expectation-disconfirmation theory (EDT) 
(Bhattacherjee, 2001) and the cognition change model 
(CCM) (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004), we argue 
that post-adoptive modified beliefs—that is, the degree 
to which one perceives that a security technology is 
useful at the post-adoption stage—are formed based on 
the initial beliefs at the adoptive stage. Through a 
belief-updating mechanism, a user updates personal 
beliefs based on both old beliefs and new information 
about a security technology (Kim & Malhotra, 2005). 
Early beliefs can be selectively stored in long-term 
memory and thus can also have distal effects on 
modified beliefs (Kim, 2009). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to argue that users update their perceptions 
of response efficacy at the post-adoption stage when 
they have gained experience in using a specific 
security technology. Imitation-based mentality can 
also be modified at the post-adoption stage. Based on 
evidence in the IS literature (Edelen, Ince, & Kadlec, 
2016; Sun, 2013), this mentality can positively 
influence users’ continuance intention, as the literature 
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shows that IT herds tend to be robust over time 
(Walden & Browne, 2009). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H8: Response efficacy beliefs at the pre-adoption 
stage are positively associated with modified 
response efficacy beliefs at the post-adoption 
stage. 
H9: Imitation at the pre-adoption stage is positively 
associated with modified imitation at the post-
adoption stage. 
Moderate to high levels of perceived response efficacy 
may lead to increased protection motivation. Users 
tend to evaluate the efficacy of a technology and form 
perceptions about it. In the CCM, users’ perceptions 
change over time as they gain firsthand experience 
with an IT, which may cause them to change their 
subsequent IT usage behavior (Bhattacherjee & 
Premkumar, 2004). Therefore, it is likely that users’ 
perceptions of response efficacy will significantly 
influence their continuance intention. Hence, 
H10: Modified response efficacy is positively associated 
with continuance intention. 
As previously discussed, in the IS context, the 
tendency to imitate other users in uncertain 
circumstances can influence users’ adoption of 
security technologies. Herd theory posits that one of 
the primary drivers of herd behavior in uncertain 
circumstances is that a user (manager) follows the 
decisions of others because she or he does not want to 
be blamed for being the only one who did not adopt a 
certain innovation. Therefore, blame sharing could be 
a major reason for herd behavior (Scharfstein & Stein, 
1990). Conversely, users may imitate each other’s 
decisions in adopting so-called “best practices” for 
information security management because they think 
others have superior information about the alternatives 
or because they want to maintain competitive parity 
and limit rivalry (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004; 
Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  
Building on the existing literature on herd behavior in 
the IS context (Sun, 2013; Walden & Browne, 2009), 
which suggests that IT herds are usually robust and 
resilient to contrary information, we can argue that 
herd mentality may positively influence the 
continuance intention at the post-adoption stage. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H11: Modified imitation is positively related to 
continuance intention. 
The findings of previous IS research support the direct 
relationship between intention to use in the adoption 
stage and continuance intention at the post-adoption 
stage (Kim, 2009; Kim & Malhotra, 2005). This 
relationship is based on the sequential updating 
mechanism in which users form subsequent intentions 
with respect to the previous intentions that are stored 
in their long-term memories. These intentions can be 
recalled to serve as the input for subsequent intentions 
(Kim, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the 
intention to use in the initial adoption stage can be a 
distal influence on the continuance intention at the 
post-adoption stage. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H12: Intention to use an information security solution 
at the pre-adoption stage is positively associated 
with post-adoption continuance intention. 
5 Research Method  
We used a two-group experimental design by 
randomly assigning each participant to either the 
control group or the treatment group. The participants 
were recruited from two professional survey panels. A 
password manager was chosen as the security 
technology because there is a high degree of 
uncertainty among IT users about these technologies in 
terms of response efficacy. Previously, we had asked 
more than 100 business undergraduate and graduate 
students at a public university in the US whether they 
had ever used a password manager. Fewer than 2% 
said they had previously used or experienced using a 
password manager. In addition, a survey published by 
PC Magazine (Rubenking, 2015) showed that few 
people had used a password manager and that most 
users still employed traditional password management 
techniques. Therefore, we determined this IT artifact 
to be a good fit in the context our study. To ensure that 
each study subject had high uncertainty about the 
target security technology, only internet users with no 
or limited familiarity with password managers were 
qualified to participate in the first stage of the 
experiment.  
During the first stage, after reading a narrative, the 
participants answered items related to herd behavior 
and intention to engage in protection-motivated 
behaviors. After the completion of this phase, we 
invited our participants to use the password manager, 
Dashlane, for one week and tell us their opinions about 
this technology. Subsequently, the subjects in both 
groups who used Dashlane were qualified to 
participate in the second stage of the experiment. Our 
invitation language was designed to reduce the bias 
toward using Dashlane for a reward. Specifically, we 
asked the participants (who successfully completed the 
first phase) to come back and tell us what they thought 
about using this password manager. For the second 
phase, we used recruitment language that basically 
revolved around the participants’ “opinions” about 
Dashlane, rather than on the confounding factor that 
they could only participate in the second phase if they 
intended to continue using Dashlane. Later in our 
study, we found enough variance in the continuance 
intention construct to indicate that the monetary 
reward did not influence participants in expressing 
their true continuance intentions. 
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Table 1. The Experimental Design 
Condition 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
(1 week later) 
 (both groups) 
Pre-treatment measures 
(both groups) 
Treatment 
Post-treatment 
measures  
(both groups) 
1. Modified beliefs 
2. Modified imitation 
3. Continuance intention 
Control 
group 
1. Qualifying question (no 
prior experience with 
password managers) 
2. Demographic information 
No 
1. Manipulation 
check 
2. Behavioral 
intention 
3. Herd behavior 
items 
4. PMT items 
Treatment 
group 
1. Qualifying question (no 
prior experience with 
password managers) 
2. Demographic information 
Yes (providing facts 
about the widespread 
use and popularity of 
Dashlane, to trigger 
herd mentality). 
The responses collected from subjects who did not 
participate in the second stage of the experiment were 
discarded. The constructs were measured using a 7-
point Likert scale and semantic differential scales (see 
Appendix A). Table 1 describes the experimental design 
used in the pilot and primary investigations, which are 
discussed below.  
5.1 The Treatment 
The following is the structure of the narrative that the 
treatment group received (see Appendix B): 
• The first paragraph discussed the threats of 
traditional password management to capture the 
subjects’ threat appraisal. 
• The second paragraph briefly discussed the need 
for a password management tool and presented 
Dashlane as an example to capture the subjects’ 
coping appraisal. 
• The third section included a list of herd-related 
factors (also known as popularity information) 
regarding the widespread use of Dashlane. Prior 
research has used this treatment to trigger herd 
mentality in users (e.g., Tucker & Zhang, 2011; 
Dewan et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2018). 
The subjects in the control group received only the first 
two paragraphs but received no information about the 
popularity and widespread use of the password manager 
Dashlane.  
The narrative was discussed and refined in consultation 
with an expert panel team. The panel was convened to 
provide additional ideas and insights that would allow 
for the refinement of the narrative and the experimental 
instrument. The panel included six faculty members and 
IS doctoral students who were knowledgeable about 
research instrument design and the protection 
motivation literature, having conducted several similar 
experimental studies involving the measures used in this 
research. Subsequently, the full narrative was reviewed 
by several potential (nonacademic) subjects to ensure its 
clarity and cohesiveness. 
5.2 Manipulation Checks 
We also used two manipulation checks in this study. The 
first manipulation check was provided to our subjects 
immediately after they read the narrative to ensure that 
they had paid attention to the content (What was the 
name of the password manager that was discussed in the 
previous page?). Only subjects who chose Dashlane 
among other options were allowed to participate in the 
rest of the experiment. The second manipulation check 
was used to determine whether the subjects’ perceptions 
of the independent variable in each group were 
manipulated in the intended manner and to ensure that 
the experimental treatment was indeed effective. In 
other words, this manipulation check was conducted to 
determine whether the experimental manipulation was 
effective in providing strong evidence for inferring 
causality, thus proving that the level of the treatment 
was sufficiently different across groups (Marett, 2015). 
The second manipulation check we used was: Dashlane 
seems to be a widely used password manager (7-point 
Likert scale, agree/disagree). 
5.3 Software Usage Validation 
Because we had no affiliation with the Dashlane 
Corporation, we were not able to directly observe our 
subjects’ use of the Dashlane password manager. 
Therefore, we took several measures to increase the 
likelihood of obtaining truthful responses from the 
subjects by ascertaining that they had used Dashlane in 
the one-week interval between the Stage 1 instrument 
and the Stage 2 instrument. First, at the beginning of 
the survey conducted in Stage 2, we provided the 
subjects with the names of nine password managers. 
We then asked the subjects to choose the one that they 
were asked to use during the one-week interval. (See 
Appendix C.) Any subject who chose the wrong 
answer or chose Dashlane in their second or third 
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attempt was automatically disqualified to participate in 
the rest of the survey. In the next step in the screening 
process, we asked subjects to “certify” whether they 
had used Dashlane during the week. Those who chose 
“no” were disqualified from participating in the rest of 
the survey. Fortunately, only a few subjects failed 
these two validation checks. Although this method of 
validating the subjects’ use of the software was not 
perfect, the results ensured our confidence in the 
quality of the data. 
6 Initial Analysis 
Prior to the main data collection, we conducted a pilot 
study to test item reliability, factor loadings, and the 
manipulation check by using SPSS v23. In the pilot 
study, in Stage 1, we collected 103 usable responses 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) workers (53 in 
the control group; 50 in the treatment group; average age 
34 years; 43 female and 60 male respondents). We ran 
three tests before collecting the data for Stage 2. First, 
we tested the manipulation check item. The results of the 
independent t-test showed a significant difference 
between the two groups in terms of their understanding 
of the popularity of Dashlane (t(101) = -2.831, p < 0.01). 
Next, we conducted Cronbach’s reliability test. The 
results showed that all values were greater than 0.8, 
which indicated high item reliability. We also ran a 
principal component analysis (varimax rotation). The 
results showed that items significantly loaded on their 
corresponding factors with minimal cross-loading (see 
Appendix D). After one week, we managed to collect 
only 37 usable responses for use in Stage 2. High 
attrition rate is one of the most common challenges in 
multistage data collections. The sample size was too 
small to conduct a principal component analysis of 
Stage 2 constructs, so we ran a Cronbach’s reliability 
analysis. All values were above 0.9, indicating high 
reliability (see Appendix D). The manipulation was 
effective, the item loadings were significant, and 
reliability was confirmed. Therefore, we proceeded to 
the main study. 
7 Main Analysis 
In the main stage of the data collection, we first collected 
158 usable responses from mTurk Masters who had 
demonstrated excellence across a wide range of studies in 
which they had participated. They had been awarded the 
Masters qualification based on the high reliability of their 
responses. A usable response refers to data obtained from 
a respondent who successfully participated in both phases 
of the study and passed all the data quality checks (e.g., 
attention check, speed-check). Because the sample size 
was insufficient to conduct a robust confirmatory factor 
analysis and a structural analysis, we collected 56 usable 
responses from a Qualtrics professional panel and 
obtained a total of 214 usable responses (107 in the 
control group and 107 in the treatment group; average age 
39 years; 89 female and 125 male respondents). Because 
we collected data from two different sources (Amazon 
Mechanical Turk Masters and the Qualtrics panel), we 
needed to conduct measurement invariance tests before 
pooling the data obtained from these sources. Therefore, 
we conducted configural and metric invariance tests. 
Configural invariance is established when the 
unconstrained model has good fit (Ellis et al., 2008). The 
model showed a good fit: χ2/df was under 3 (1.63), CFI 
and IFI were equal or greater than 0.90, and RMSEA was 
less than 0.07 (0.05). Additionally, metric invariance is 
established when the measurement weights χ2 statistic is 
not significant (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). The 
results of a chi-square difference test indicated metric 
invariance between the groups (df = 30; χ2 = 38.47; p = 
0.138). Thus, we pooled the data from both sources and 
proceeded with the analysis. The descriptive statistics, 
such as average means and standard deviations, are 
provided in Appendix E. 
7.1 Measurement Reliability and 
Validity 
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using 
AMOS v24. This analysis included the assessment of 
factor loadings, model fit, construct reliability, 
convergent validity, discriminant validity, and the test for 
common method bias. The factor loadings were 
significant (above 0.7), and the model fit statistics were 
above the minimum acceptable levels (Chin & Todd, 
1995), which indicated that the model fit the data (χ2/df = 
1.66, CFI = 0.95, IFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.05). Table 2 
shows the factor loadings.  
All constructs had acceptable levels of reliability ( ≥ 0.70) 
(MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011). The initial 
reliability scores were obtained through reliability 
analysis in which composite reliability (CR) was 
computed. Next, the convergent and discriminant validity 
of the measures were assessed by a confirmatory factor 
analysis using AMOS v24. Convergent validity is 
demonstrated when the items in the same construct are 
significantly correlated. Furthermore, item loadings 
greater than 0.70 and an average variance extracted 
(AVE) above 0.50 indicate convergent validity (Straub, 
Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004). All items were loaded 
significantly on their corresponding construct ( > 0.70). 
Additionally, all constructs had an AVE greater than 0.50. 
Therefore, the results indicate convergent validity. 
Discriminant validity is present when the items in a 
construct do not significantly correlate with the items in 
another construct. Discriminant validity is confirmed by 
calculating the square root of AVEs and comparing them 
against the correlation measures of other constructs. The 
square root of AVEs was greater than interconstruct 
correlations; therefore, the results indicated discriminant 
validity (Straub et al. 2004). Table 3 shows the composite 
reliabilities and AVEs, as well as the square roots of 
AVEs (in bold) and their correlations: 
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Table 2. Factor Loadings 
Construct Item Loading 
Threat susceptibility (TSUS) 
TSUS1 .72 
TSUS2 .75 
TSUS3 .86 
Threat severity (TSEV) 
TSEV1 .88 
TSEV2 .79 
TSEV3 .93 
Response efficacy (RE) 
RE1 .87 
RE2 .89 
RE3 .76 
Perceived uncertainty (UNC) 
UNC1 .80 
UNC2 .76 
UNC3 .83 
UNC4 .77 
Discounting own information (DOI) 
DOI1 .86 
DOI2 .85 
DOI3 .69 
Imitation (IMI) 
IMI1 .90 
IMI2 .91 
IMI3 .89 
Switching costs (SW) 
SW1 .76 
SW2 .85 
SW3 .86 
Modified response efficacy (ModRE) 
ModRE1 .94 
ModRE2 .89 
ModRE3 .91 
Continuance intention (CONT) 
CONT1 .95 
CONT2 .95 
CONT3 .98 
Modified imitation (ModIMI) 
ModIMI1 .87 
ModIMI2 .93 
ModIMI3 .92 
Behavioral intention (BI) to  
engage in protection-motivated 
behaviors 
B1 .93 
B2 .93 
B3 .96 
B4 .96 
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
438 
 
Table 3. Reliability, Validity, the Square Roots of AVEs (in Bold), and Correlations 
Construct 
(CR; AVE) 
BI TSUS TSEV RE UNC DOI IMI SW 
Mod 
RE 
CONT 
Mod 
IMI 
BI 
(0.97;0.90) 
.95           
TSUS 
(.82;.61) 
.38 .78          
TSEV 
(.90;.76) 
.18 .49 .87         
RE 
(.88;.71) 
.61 .45 .39 .84        
UNC 
(.87;.62) 
-.31 -.00 .02 -.36 .79       
DOI 
(.85;.65) 
.03 .11 -.09 -.23 .62 .81      
IMI 
(.93;.81) 
.68 .38 .15 .56 -.18 .21 .90     
SW 
(.86;.68) 
.11 .21 .04 .06 .21 .22 .22 .82    
ModRE 
(.93;.83) 
.46 .16 .11 .33 -.11 .10 .39 .15 .91   
CONT 
(.97;.92) 
.41 .18 .11 .31 -.02 .14 .41 .25 .85 .96  
ModIMI 
(.93;.83) 
.48 .25 .10 .23 .09 .33 .53 .36 .62 .67 .91 
Table 4. The Chi-Square Difference Test 
Prior to dropping items After dropping items 
Without CLF With CLF Without CLF With CLF 
χ2 df χ2 df χ2 df χ2 df 
1260 782 1230 781 857.4 587 853.8 586 
 
7.2 Common Method Bias 
We tried to reduce the common method bias using 
procedural and statistical methods (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Specifically, we used several procedural 
remedies, such as the temporal separation of construct 
measurement, ensuring the anonymity of the 
participants, item randomization, and attention checks. 
Additionally, before testing the structural model and 
hypotheses, we used the common latent factor (CLF) 
method as a post hoc statistical procedure, which is 
highly effective in detecting common method bias 
(Schwarz et al., 2017). If a systematic bias due to the 
method is present, the CLF will be found to have a 
relationship with every scale item. The variance of the 
unmeasured latent method factor is set to 1 and the 
regression weights for all relationships to this variable 
are constrained equally. In this study, a confirmatory 
factor analysis was performed with and without a 
common method factor to determine the presence of 
common method bias. The results of the chi-square 
analysis showed a significant difference ( > 3.84). To 
determine the items that caused the significant bias, we 
ran the measurement model 43 times, which was the 
number of items in the model. We compared the chi-
square differences between the models with and 
without the CLF. Five items (TSEV2, DOI3, BI3, 
SAT4, and UNC2) accounted for the significant 
difference between the chi-square values. After these 
items were eliminated in order to reduce the common 
method bias, the chi-square difference between the two 
models was insignificant (χ2 difference = 3.6, df 
difference = 1), which is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 5. Path Estimates 
Relationship 
Control group Treatment group 
Std. 
estimate 
t-value p-value 
Std. 
estimate 
t-value p-value 
H1: TSUS → RE  .35   2.93 .003**  .31   2.58 .01* 
H2: TSEV → RE  .21   1.91 .056 (n.s)  .29   2.51 .01* 
H3: RE → BI  .37   4.18 ***  .38   4.53 *** 
H4: UNC → DOI  .77   8.25 ***  .34   3.14 .002** 
H5: DOI → IMI  .09     .90 .36 (n.s)  .26   2.22 .02* 
H6: DOI moderating effect -.20  -2.82 .005** -.32  -6.37 *** 
H7: IMI → BI  .51   5.77 ***  .63   8.01 *** 
H8: RE → ModRE  .37   3.69 ***  .32   3.04 002** 
H9: IMI → ModIMI  .59   6.56 ***  .51   5.28 *** 
H10: ModRE → CONT  .77 12.65 ***  .78 10.97 *** 
H11: ModIMI → CONT  .36   5.91 ***  .24   3.50 *** 
H12: BI → CONT -.01   -.17 .85 (n.s) -.02    -.39 .69 (n.s) 
Control: Age → CONT  .10   1.67 .093(n.s)  .10     .21 .833(n.s) 
Control: Gender → CONT  .06  1.07 .283(n.s)  .05     .20 .376(n.s) 
Control: SW → CONT  .06  1.49 .13 (n.s)  .11   1.77 .07 (n.s) 
Notes: n.s = nonsignificant, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 6. Hypotheses Testing Results 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1: Perceptions of threat susceptibility positively influence perceptions of response efficacy. Yes 
H2: Perceptions of threat severity positively influence perceptions of response efficacy. Yes 
H3: Response efficacy positively influences the intention to use the information security solution. Yes 
H4: Uncertainty about using a security technology is positively associated with users’ discounting their own 
information. 
Yes 
H5: Discounting one’s own information increases the tendency of users to imitate the behavior of other 
users. 
Yes 
H6: Discounting one’s own information negatively moderates the relationship between response 
efficacy and behavioral intention to engage in protection-motivated behaviors. 
Yes 
H7: Imitating others is positively associated with a user’s intention to use the information security solution 
to protect against a security threat. 
Yes 
H8: Response efficacy beliefs at the pre-adoption stage are positively associated with modified response 
efficacy beliefs at the post-adoption stage. 
Yes 
H9: Imitation at the pre-adoption stage is positively associated with modified imitation at the post-adoption 
stage. 
Yes 
H10. Modified response efficacy is positively associated with continuance intention. Yes 
H11: Modified imitation is positively related to continuance intention. Yes 
H12: Intention to use an information security solution at the pre-adoption stage is positively associated with 
post-adoption continuance intention.  
No 
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Table 7. Model Comparison 
Model Control group Treatment group 
PMT constructs only .35 .39 
Full model .39 .53 
 
 
Notes: n.s = nonsignificant, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001, dotted lines = unsupported paths. 
Figure 2. Treatment Group Path Estimates 
 
Notes: n.s = nonsignificant, * p  < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, dotted lines = unsupported paths. 
Figure 3. Control Group Path Estimates 
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To ensure that the elimination of these items did not 
negatively influence the reliability and validity of the 
constructs, we also ran these tests using the remaining 
items. The results showed that the factor loadings, CR, 
and convergent and discriminant validity were 
acceptable. The tables showing the results of these 
analyses are provided in Appendix F. 
7.3 Structural Analysis 
In the next step, we analyzed the structural model. The 
model fit statistics were equal to or greater than the 
recommended values (χ2/df = 1.76, CFI = 0.91, IFI = 
0.91, RMSEA = 0.06). We tested the hypotheses 
through covariance-based structural equation 
modeling (SEM) using AMOS v24). To test for the 
moderating effects, we used the product-of-sums 
approach recommended by Goodhue, Lewis, and 
Thompson (2007). Specifically, the moderating factor 
(discounting one’s own information) and the 
independent variable (response efficacy) were 
multiplied to generate an interaction factor (DOI × 
RE), which was then linked to the intention to engage 
in protection-motivated behaviors (the dependent 
variable). We also measured the influence of the 
control variables (age, gender, and switching costs) on 
continuance intention (the ultimate dependent 
variable). As previously described, this study used a 
control group and a treatment group. We conducted an 
analysis to compare the statistical differences between 
these two groups. For this purpose, we used a dummy-
coded variable to split the dataset into two groups. 
Table 5 shows the path estimates in both groups. Table 
6 provides a summary of the results of testing the 
hypotheses.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the structural 
model analysis of the treatment and control groups.  
Finally, in the post hoc analysis, we compared the 
explained variance of protection motivation 
(behavioral intention) across groups. To conduct this 
analysis, we compared two models, “PMT constructs 
only” and “full model,” which included both PMT 
constructs and herd behavior constructs. Table 7 
summarizes the results of this comparison. 
The results show that for the control group, adding the 
herd behavior constructs to the PMT constructs (which 
forms the full model) only explains 4% more of the 
variance in behavioral intention. However, for the 
treatment group (i.e., the participants who received the 
popularity information about Dashlane), the full model 
(which included both PMT constructs and herd 
behavior constructs) explained 14% more variance in 
behavioral intention than the PMT constructs-only 
model. These findings indicate that the treatment made 
a significant difference in the participants’ intentions 
to use the password manager, which was the popular 
security technology in the narrative. See Appendix G 
for the effect sizes related to this analysis. 
8 Discussion 
This research contributes to the literature by examining 
whether obtaining popularity information about a 
security technology can trigger herd mentality and 
increase protection motivation. We hypothesized that 
discounting one’s own information can lead to the 
tendency to imitate the behavior of others. By 
discounting one’s own information in uncertain 
circumstances, the user relies less on limited 
information and beliefs and tends to rely heavily on the 
insights gained from observations of others’ behavior. 
Logically, the more that users discount their own 
limited information, the more likely they will tend to 
imitate the behavior of others. In contrast, if users do 
not discount their own beliefs, their protection 
motivation is determined by their personal perceptions 
of response efficacy. Consistent with this line of 
reasoning, we found that the effect on imitation of 
discounting one’s own information was nonsignificant 
for the control group, which did not receive the 
popularity information (the treatment) about Dashlane. 
Conversely, discounting one’s own information 
significantly and positively influenced imitation in the 
treatment group. Discounting their own information 
drove subjects to become less responsive to their own 
information; instead, these subjects favored other 
users’ decisions, believing that others were better 
informed. Therefore, they tended to imitate others even 
if their own information might have led them to 
different conclusions. 
Furthermore, the findings show that the subjects in the 
treatment group developed a higher level of protection 
motivation compared to those in the control group. In 
terms of explained variance (R2), the treatment group 
model explained more variance in the ultimate 
dependent variable at the pre-adoption stage 
(behavioral intention) compared to the control group 
(54% and 39%, respectively). This difference could be 
the result of a stronger tendency to imitate among the 
subjects in the treatment group compared to the 
subjects in the control group. Response efficacy, as the 
other direct antecedent of behavioral intention, 
similarly influenced the motivation of the treatment 
and control group. The standardized path coefficients 
equaled 0.38 and 0.37, respectively, suggesting that the 
tendency to imitate caused the difference between the 
two groups. Additionally, we found that discounting 
one’s own information negatively moderates the 
relationship between response efficacy (i.e., personal 
assessment) and behavioral intention. According to 
herd theory, discounting one’s own information means 
that users rely less on their own beliefs in making 
technology adoption decisions. Thus, the more 
discounting, the less important personal beliefs are in 
making such decisions, demonstrating a weak 
anchoring effect of these beliefs (Sun 2013). As we 
expected, this moderating effect was stronger for the 
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treatment group (-0.32*** versus -0.20**). In addition, 
the cognitive process of discounting one’s own 
information leading to imitation was only significant 
for the treatment group. Originally, we hypothesized 
that when users discount their own information, they 
rely less on their initial information and beliefs than on 
the insights obtained from their observations of others’ 
behavior. Logically, the more a user discounts his or 
her own information, the more likely he or she will be 
to imitate the behavior of others. Our findings show 
that this only happened for the treatment group, which 
received the popularity information about Dashlane.  
Drawing on these findings, we argue that in the IS 
security context, the tendency to imitate other users in 
highly uncertain circumstances influences users’ 
protection motivation (i.e., the adoption of security 
technologies). It is reasonable to argue that at the post-
adoption stage, users may continue to imitate others. In 
other words, users may continue to use the same 
security technology because it is used by a large 
number of people. Consistently, we hypothesized that 
modified perceptions of response efficacy and 
imitation are positively related to users’ continuance 
intentions. The results show that herd mentality is not 
as influential as personal assessments (i.e., response 
efficacy) at the post-adoption stage. Modified response 
efficacy, which can be a proxy for the personal 
assessment of a security technology at the post-
adoption stage, influenced continuance intention with 
a beta-coefficient (0.78) more than three times as 
strong as that of the modified imitation (0.24), 
suggesting that at the post-adoption stage, personal 
assessment becomes the dominant factor in 
determining continuance intention. 
In contrast, at the pre-adoption stage, the influence of 
herd mentality on adoption intention (i.e., protection 
motivation) was twice as strong as that of personal 
assessment (0.63 versus 0.38) in the treatment group. 
This finding indicates that at the post-adoption stage, 
when users have less uncertainty about the security 
technology because of their experience, they rely 
heavily on their own assessments and put less emphasis 
on the popularity information about a security 
technology. A possible explanation for this finding 
could be the sensitivity and delicacy of security-related 
decisions. The consequences of making a poor 
adoption decision in the security context could be far 
more catastrophic than the consequences of a decision 
regarding a technology in another context (e.g., 
hedonic). Therefore, users are likely to put less 
emphasis on its popularity and exert greater efforts into 
making personal evaluations of the security technology 
efficacy.  
An unexpected finding of this research is that 
behavioral intention at Stage 1 did not influence 
continuance intention at the post-adoption stage (H12). 
Similar to our findings, the findings of Kim & 
Malhotra (2005) also show that the relationship 
between behavioral intention at the pre-adoption and 
post-adoption stage is not significant. A reason 
explaining this result could be the role of experience 
with security technologies. It is reasonable to argue 
that prior experience with security technologies is a 
crucial factor in determining continuous behavior 
because users who have directly experienced using 
such technologies are likely to have a significant level 
of expectation disconfirmation (positive or negative); 
thus, the anticipation of a direct relationship between 
intention to engage in protection-motivated behaviors 
(at the pre-adoption stage) and continuous secure 
behavior (at the post-adoption stage) may be 
unwarranted. In a post hoc analysis of possible 
mediating effects of modified imitation and modified 
response efficacy on the relationship between pre-
adoption behavioral intention and later continuance 
intention, we ran two mediation analyses (using 
bootstrapping) and found that both modified imitation 
and modified response efficacy fully mediate the 
relationship between behavioral intention and 
continuance intention (p = 0.004 and p = 0.01, 
respectively). 
9 Contributions to Research 
Consistent with the recent call for understanding the 
roots of behavioral security (Chatterjee, Sarker & 
Valacich, 2015), this study contributes to the literature 
by examining the effects of herd mentality on security 
behaviors. IT users often make decisions related to 
information security decisions in complex and 
multidimensional environments, which could lead to 
phenomena like behavioral anomalies. Current 
behavioral security theories generally assume that 
users possess sufficient information about security 
technologies before making security-related decisions. 
This theory assumption limits our understanding of 
how security decisions are made in various real-world 
circumstances. We further improved our 
understanding of secure behavior by examining herd 
mentality as one of the most important boundary 
conditions in this area. In this regard, our findings 
show that when individuals make decisions in highly 
uncertain circumstances, they may observe the 
behavior of others, discount their own limited 
information, and imitate others. According to our 
empirical analysis, the “discounting own information 
→ imitation” and the “imitation → behavioral 
intention” relationships were stronger in the treatment 
group because the subjects received information about 
the behavior of others, that is, the widespread use of 
the password manager. 
This study also contributes to the literature by providing 
insights into the continuity of security behaviors over 
time when such behaviors are influenced by a herd 
mentality. Based on the few relevant studies in the IS 
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context, we hypothesized that at the post-adoption stage, 
herd mentality can still influence continuance intentions 
because IT herds have been shown to be robust and they 
tend to survive even when contrary signals and 
information are received (Edelen et al., 2016; Sun, 
2013). Surprisingly, the findings of our study show that 
herd mentality (conceptualized as modified imitation), 
as compared to updated personal perceptions 
(conceptualized as modified response efficacy), 
becomes weaker at the post-adoption stage. Instead, the 
personal assessment of the focal security technology 
used in this study significantly influenced users’ 
continuance intentions. 
Our findings indicate that at the post-adoption stage, 
after the users had gained experience with the security 
technology, they relied heavily on their own 
assessments. These findings indicate that the 
awareness of the popularity and widespread use of the 
security response were not as important as they were at 
the pre-adoption stage. In addition, the results of the 
post hoc analysis showed that dropping “modified 
imitation” from the Time 2 model did not reduce the 
R-squared of continuance intention in either group, 
indicating that while imitation is an important factor at 
the post-adoption stage, it is not as influential as it is in 
the pre-adoption stage. The findings of this study 
indicate that a deep understanding of secure behavior 
requires nuanced and fine-grained analyses of this 
phenomenon for several reasons. For example, 
different boundary conditions could affect IS security 
behaviors differently. Furthermore, the effects of 
boundary conditions on secure behaviors could differ 
in other contexts. Moreover, based on the findings of 
this study, these effects could differ in the different 
stages of security technology use. 
As mentioned earlier, users’ perceptions of response 
efficacy (i.e., the effectiveness of a specific security 
solution) and other perceptions (e.g., imitation 
tendency) should be measured at both the post-
adoption stage and at the adoption stage in order to 
capture the dynamic nature of the continuous behavior 
phenomenon, thus allowing for understanding the 
distal effects of the underlying cognitive process that 
influences continuous behavior (Kim & Malhotra, 
2005; Vedadi & Warkentin, 2018). Regarding the 
multistage design of this study, which includes pre-
adoption and post-adoption perceptions of the security 
software, we used rigorous scale development 
guidelines (MacKenzie et al., 2011) to develop and 
validate two constructs—modified response efficacy 
and modified imitation—in order to measure these 
perceptions at the post-adoption stage. This method 
was especially important because users generally 
undergo a belief-updating process after gaining direct 
experience with a technology. Therefore, the 
conceptualization and operationalization of these 
concepts were crucial. In future research on behavioral 
security and herd behavior in the IS context, these 
validated measurement scales can be used to measure 
the longitudinal nature of security behavior and 
decision-making in highly uncertain circumstances 
(see Appendix H).  
Finally, though our contributions, especially informed 
by Sun (2013), contextualize herd theory within the 
security behavior continuance domain, this study is 
distinguished from other IT herd behavior studies, 
especially Sun’s (2013), in several ways. Our primary 
focus in the pre-adoption stage is the participants’ level 
of protection motivation and how providing popularity 
information (the experimental treatment) can increase 
the level of these intentions to engage in protection-
motivated behaviors. We found that the treatment was 
successful in increasing the level of protection 
motivation and that such herd mentality can exert an 
even stronger influence than users’ personal 
perceptions (i.e., perceived response efficacy). 
Furthermore, Sun (2013) measured users’ perceptions 
vicariously by using constructs such as 
disconfirmation and satisfaction. We, however, 
conceptualized and operationalized two new constructs 
(modified response and modified imitation) in order to 
more accurately and directly measure these 
perceptions. Specifically, Sun (2013) did not measure 
herd mentality at the post-adoption stage and limited 
his measurement of this important phenomenon by 
finding a positive relationship between imitation (at the 
pre-adoption stage) and disconfirmation (at the post-
adoption). Using these two new constructs, we directly 
measured our participants’ perceptions and our 
findings were consistent with theory. 
10  Contributions to Practice 
Because users’ decision-making can be strongly 
influenced by the behavior of others, both managers 
and software security vendors should consider framing 
their communications (e.g., advertising and security 
training, respectively) to publicize positive 
information (e.g., performing a popular security 
procedure that is widely used by other employees). Our 
empirical findings support this argument because the 
size of the effect of herd-related factors on protection 
motivation was found to be medium (0.29) for the 
treatment group, whereas it was small for the control 
group (0.04), thus indicating that the experimental 
treatment (providing popularity information) made a 
significant difference in the participants’ intention to 
use the password manager. In other words, managers 
can expect to increase the overall security of their 
organization by providing information about the 
security behavior of others. For example, Barlow et al. 
(2018) found that a message providing information 
about the compliance of others increased the likelihood 
that users would comply with security policies. 
Specifically, their normative influence manipulation, a 
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form of psychological nudge, informed the message 
recipient that “a recent survey of our employees 
concerning this policy showed that over 85 percent 
would not share their password, even with another 
employee, regardless of the circumstances.” (pp. 709-
710) 
Furthermore, fostering herd mentality in security 
behavior could significantly enhance and accelerate 
the process of securing information assets. 
Nevertheless, herding users toward or away from a 
certain behavior should be done with extreme care. It 
is possible that users may find that the advertised 
organizational adopters (i.e., the herd leaders) do not 
resemble them in terms of organizational tasks, 
sophistication, and so on. Therefore, the successful 
promotion of herd mentality to ensure certain secure 
behaviors that comply with IT security policies in 
organizations would require managers to highlight the 
similarities between the prior adopters and potential 
adopters to increase the likelihood of imitation. 
Managers should also recognize that in a voluntary 
context, IT security herds may not last because a high 
number of users might lose interest in using a security 
technology, thus leading to the collapse of the current 
user base and the herd itself. Specifically, users may 
ultimately evaluate their own needs and contexts of 
local use (Sun, 2013). Consequently, they may cease to 
incorporate herd mentality in their decision-making 
and may rely strictly on their own perceptions of and 
experiences in using a security technology. Similarly, 
companies sometimes imitate each other to emulate 
their competitors or they believe that their competitors’ 
choices of technology and systems are based on better 
information (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). This 
approach to decision-making can occasionally increase 
the likelihood of errors for first movers and it can lead 
to sending the wrong signal to late movers. Therefore, 
imitation-based IT strategies may lead to negative 
consequences for companies if they decide to use the 
wrong security technologies. Hence, it is important for 
IT managers and policy makers to predict the IT 
security phenomena that are highly likely to become 
popular, thoroughly identify their disadvantageous 
implications, and consider the possible opportunities 
for leveraging such phenomena in a positive way while 
diminishing potential negative consequences.  
11  Limitations and Future 
Research 
This research has the following limitations. First, a 
distinction between correct and incorrect herds in the 
security context should be made in future studies. In 
uncertain circumstances, a user may join and remain in 
an IT herd, thus adopting a superior security 
technology when there is a positive and strong enough 
signal about it (Walden & Brown, 2009). Conversely, 
incorrect herds are characterized by users who develop 
unrealistic expectations based on observation of 
actions of predecessors and, consequently, become 
more susceptible to contrary information at the post-
adoption stage; therefore, these herds are generally 
more fragile than correct herds. In our study, we only 
tested the positive effects of popularity information, 
but we question whether negative information about 
few adoptions at the post-adoption stage also has an 
influence. This limitation provides an interesting 
opportunity for future research to examine how 
contrary information about a security technology over 
time may reverse herd direction. 
Future research should also account for relevant 
individual differences. In the herd behavior context, 
some users may intentionally avoid joining a security 
technology herd because they want to stand out from 
the crowd. In other words, some users may feel that 
adopting popular technology may make them seem 
average. This attitude has also been observed at the 
organizational level; some organizations persist in 
differentiating themselves from their competitors, and 
they avoid using a security technology because it is 
“too popular” in the industry (Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf, 1993). Future studies should investigate 
the cognitive styles and personality traits that make 
users more or less likely to follow an IT herd. 
In addition to individual differences in personality 
traits, cultural differences might influence herd 
behavior in the IT security context. The subjects of this 
study were in the US, which limits the generalizability 
of the findings to users in other cultures. Ethnic groups 
may have significantly different espoused cultural 
values, which may or may not be reflected in individual 
behavior (Srite & Karahanna, 2006; Crossler, et al., 
2013). The finance literature indicates that cultural 
differences can have a significant influence on herd 
behavior (Hong et al., 2016). For instance, Chang and 
Lin’s (2015) study on the effects of national culture on 
investors’ decision-making in international stock 
markets provide evidence that herd behavior occurs 
more often in Confucian equity markets. Their findings 
also show that certain national cultural indices closely 
correlate with herding behavior. Therefore, cross-
cultural research should be conducted to reveal the 
importance of additional factors that could influence 
herd mentality in the behavioral security context. 
To ensure that our research model was as parsimonious 
as possible, we decided not to include all behavioral 
security constructs and to focus on the most established 
constructs of threat and coping appraisal. Future 
research could evaluate the effects of various fear 
appeals and other constructs on herd behavior, such as 
response cost, maladaptive reward, and self-efficacy. 
Response cost, which is any perceived cost (e.g., 
monetary, personal, time, and effort) associated with 
the adaptive coping response, may substantially affect 
users’ tendency to join or avoid a herd. Response 
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efficacy and self-efficacy may elevate the probability 
of adopting a security technology, whereas the 
perception of high response costs could decrease this 
probability (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000).  
Regarding the use of password managers, one of the 
most important concerns of potential users is the issue 
of trust. In line with the conventional wisdom, “do not 
put all your eggs in one basket,” using a single 
password manager could invite hackers to attack and 
steal a user’s passwords if that single control were 
compromised. However, some users might risk using a 
single password manager if it provided more security 
than their own passwords. Therefore, investigating the 
influence of different types and levels of trust 
(McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002) and how it 
can affect users’ herd mentality is an interesting and 
important topic for future research. Baddeley (2011) 
emphasized the important role of trust in herd 
behavior, noting that in human behavior regarding 
security, decisions are made in a multidimensional 
space that reflects contradictory goals. Therefore, trust 
is a vital influence in this area because effective 
security software allows transparent communication 
between trusted parties, which is closed to the “bad 
guys” (p. 13). 
Because there is often a high risk of drop-out (attrition) 
with multistage data collection projects, we opted for a 
one-week time frame between the data collection 
stages to reduce this threat. In addition, because 
password managers are typically simple technologies 
that, unlike some utilitarian technologies with 
numerous features and complexities, are fairly easy to 
use and mostly automated, we considered our time 
frame to be adequate. However, this short time frame 
might be insufficient for comprehensively reflecting 
the continuance intention of users; thus, future studies 
could define multistage data collection projects with 
longer time frames in order to more realistically 
examine the continuance intention phenomenon in the 
herd behavior context.  
Future research could examine this security-related 
phenomenon using objective data collection methods, 
as recommended by Crossler, et al (2013) and 
Warkentin, Straub, and Malimage (2012), such as 
examining neurophysiological indicators of cognitive 
functions evident during this decision process (e.g., 
Warkentin, Walden et al., 2016). Another interesting 
future research avenue would be to analyze the 
difference between organizational and home users’ 
behavior in this context, given that norms and 
popularity information may be more established in the 
workplace than in homes because of the larger cohort 
of peers at work. Differential organizational cultures 
may also impact herd mentality in ways that could be 
explored in future research. Much like national culture, 
some organizational cultures may convey a greater 
implicit signal regarding conformity or individuality, 
thus moderating the impact of popularity information 
and the resulting herd behavior. 
12 Conclusion 
IT users often make information security-related 
decisions in complex and multidimensional 
environments, which could lead to phenomena like 
behavioral anomalies. For instance, under uncertain 
circumstances, users may discount their own limited 
information about a security technology and make their 
adoption decisions based on what the majority of users’ 
decisions are in this regard. Current behavioral security 
theories generally assume that users possess sufficient 
information about security technologies before making 
security-related decisions. This theory assumption 
limits our understanding of how security decisions are 
made in various real-world circumstances. We 
investigated how providing popularity information can 
trigger herd behavior and can subsequently influence 
security behaviors. We also provide insights into 
security-related decisions that are influenced by herd 
mentality and whether they persist over time. We 
found that in uncertain circumstances, when users 
become aware of the widespread use of a certain 
security technology, they develop a significantly 
higher protection motivation. Furthermore, we found 
that at the post-adoption stage, users rely more heavily 
on their own information about their continuous use of 
security technologies and place less emphasis on herd-
related factors.
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Appendix A. Construct Definitions and Measurement Scales 
Perceived uncertainty (UNC) 
Definition: the degree to which one is unable to accurately predict the issues related to the adoption of a technology 
due to imperfect information (Sun, 2013). 
 
Measurement scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. I am NOT sure what Dashlane is about and what it can do for me. 
2. I feel uncertain whether my needs when logging onto websites securely could be met by using Dashlane. 
3. I feel uncertain whether I would be able to respond appropriately to any changes/upgrades of Dashlane. 
4. I feel that using Dashlane involves a high degree of uncertainty. 
Imitation (IMI) 
Definition: the degree to which one follows previous adopters to adopt a certain form of technology (Sun, 2013). 
 
Measurement scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. It seems that Dashlane is a widely-used password manager, therefore I would like to use it too. 
2. I follow others in deciding to use Dashlane. 
3. I would choose to use Dashlane because many others are already using it. 
Discounting one’s own information (DOI) 
Definition: the degree to which one disregards his/her own beliefs about a technology when making an adoption 
decision (Sun, 2013). 
 
Measurement scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. I don’t fully trust my own thinking about how Dashlane could work for me. 
2. I would not necessarily follow my own thoughts about Dashlane’s features. 
3. I would not rely only on my own information about how Dashlane works. 
Behavioral intention (protection motivation) (BI) 
Definition: Users’ intention to use a particular security solution (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). 
 
Measurement scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. I intend to use Dashlane in future. 
2. I plan to use Dashlane soon. 
3. I predict I will use Dashlane soon. 
4. I expect to adopt Dashlane soon. 
Threat severity (TSEV) 
Definition: the degree to which a user believes a security threat could have severe consequences (Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010). 
 
Measurement scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. If my passwords were stolen, lost, or forgotten, the consequences would be severe. 
2. If my passwords were stolen, lost, or forgotten, the consequences would be serious. 
3. If my passwords were stolen, lost, or forgotten, the consequences would be significant. 
Threat susceptibility (TSUS) 
Definition: refers to users’ perception about the probability of suffering from an IT security threat (Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010). 
 
Measurement scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. My passwords are at risk of being stolen, lost, or forgotten. 
2. It is likely that my passwords will be stolen, lost, or forgotten. 
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3. It is possible that my passwords will be stolen, lost, or forgotten. 
Response efficacy (RE) 
Definition: the degree to which an individual believes the response to be effective in alleviating a threat (Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010). 
 
Measurement Scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. Using Dashlane works for password protection. 
2. Using Dashlane is effective for password protection. 
3. By using Dashlane, my passwords are more likely to be protected. 
Continuance intention (CONT) 
Definition: Users intention to continue using a technology (Bhattacherjee, 2001). 
 
Measurement Scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. I intend to continue using Dashlane rather than discontinue its use. 
2. My intentions are to continue using Dashlane rather than use any alternative means. 
3. I would like to continue my use of Dashlane. 
Modified response efficacy (ModRE) 
Definition: as the degree to which one perceives that a security technology is useful at the post-adoption stage (self-
developed). 
 
Measurement Scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. Using Dashlane improves my performance in managing my passwords. 
2. Using Dashlane increases my productivity in managing my passwords. 
3. Using Dashlane enhances my effectiveness in managing my passwords. 
Modified imitation (ModIMI) 
Definition: as the degree to which one perceives that imitation is a good strategy for continuous use of a technology 
(self-developed). 
 
Measurement Scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. It seems that Dashlane is a widely-used password manager, therefore I would like to continue using it. 
2. I follow others to continue to use Dashlane. 
3. I would choose to continue to use Dashlane because many others are already using it. 
Switching costs (SW) 
Definition: The extent to which a customer feels dependent on a service because of economic, social or 
psychological investments that would become useless in other services (Kim & Son, 2009). 
 
Measurement Scale (7-point agree/disagree Likert scale): 
1. Switching to a new password manager would involve some hassle. 
2. Some problems may occur if I switch to another password manager. 
3. It would be complex to change my password manager. 
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Appendix B. Treatment Narrative 
Using strong passwords has always been one of the most important issues of data security. Many users create 
security problems by using passwords that are too simple to ensure security or too complex to remember. Other users 
reuse the same password for different websites, which also creates security problems, or make themselves vulnerable 
to password theft by saving their passwords on their browsers. 
 
A password manager is a software that helps you effectively and conveniently store and organize passwords. A good 
example is Dashlane, which is a free, efficient and easy-to-use password manager that can be comfortably integrated 
with most web browsers and smartphones. 
 
Here is the list of facts about Dashlane: 
 
• The number of internet users who are using password managers is rapidly growing. 
• According to Download.com, Dashlane is one of the most downloaded password managers. 
• The password manager market is expected to increase from $311 million in 2014 to $710 million by 2019. 
• 1 out of 3 internet users is actively using password manager tools. 
• Other reports show that the vast majority of internet users are planning to adopt password managers in near 
future. 
• Leading analyst firms have predicted that the number of companies throughout the world that are planning to 
invest in password managers, and especially in Dashlane, will exponentially grow in near future. 
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Appendix C. Software Usage Validity Checks 
Figure C1. Usage Validity Checks 
Appendix D. Pilot Study Statistics 
Table D1. Stage 1: Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Test 
Construct Alpha 
Protection motivation  .96 
Threat severity .91 
Threat susceptibility  .83 
Response efficacy .88 
Perceived uncertainty .85 
Discounting own information .83 
Imitation .91 
Modified response efficacy .91 
Switching cost .83 
Modified imitation .95 
Continuance intention .95 
 
 
Table D2. Stage 1: Principal Component Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BI1 .85       
BI2 .89       
BI3 .89       
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BI4 .92       
UNC1  .79      
UNC2  .81      
UNC3  .77      
UNC4  .81      
DOI1  .40  .72    
DOI2    .79    
DOI3    .81    
IMI1     .79   
IMI2 .44    .73   
IMI3     .86   
RE1      .74  
RE2      .78  
RE3      .83  
TSUS1       .83 
TSUS2       .79 
TSUS3       .83 
TSEV1   .89     
TSEV2   .87     
TSEV3   .89     
Notes: The values are suppressed to 0.4. Varimax rotation. 
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Appendix E. Item Descriptive Statistics 
Table E1. Item Average Means and Standard Deviations 
 Control Treatment 
Item Average Std. deviation Average Std. deviation 
TSUS1 5.07 1.5 5.10 1.3 
TSUS2 4.36 1.5 4.30 1.4 
TSUS3 4.93 1.4 4.71 1.4 
TSEV1 5.43 1.5 5.42 1.4 
TSEV2 5.34 1.4 5.59 1.3 
TSEV3 5.22 1.4 5.24 1.4 
RE1 5.37 1.3 5.21 1.4 
RE2 5.32 1.3 5.17 1.2 
RE3 5.31 1.4 5.37 1.1 
UNC1 3.10 1.7 3.47 1.7 
UNC2 3.07 1.6 3.11 1.6 
UNC3 3.40 1.7 3.86 1.6 
UNC4 2.91 1.7 3.14 1.7 
DOI1 3.05 1.8 3.06 1.5 
DOI2 3.04 1.5 3.42 1.5 
DOI3 3.76 1.7 4.01 1.6 
IMI1 4.32 1.6 4.28 1.8 
IMI2 4.58 1.6 4.54 1.6 
IMI3 4.06 1.7 4.03 1.6 
SW1 4.44 1.6 5.00 1.3 
SW2 4.01 1.5 4.48 1.4 
SW3 3.87 1.6 4.33 1.4 
ModRE1 5.19 1.4 5.35 1.3 
ModRE2 5.13 1.4 5.11 1.4 
ModRE3 5.19 1.4 5.35 1.4 
CONT1 4.50 1.8 4.82 1.7 
CONT2 4.65 1.8 4.91 1.6 
CONT3 4.64 1.8 4.83 1.7 
ModIMI1 3.64 1.8 3.73 1.7 
ModIMI2 3.92 1.7 3.89 1.7 
ModIMI3 3.86 1.7 3.80 1.7 
B1 4.67 1.6 4.29 1.5 
B2 4.62 1.6 4.19 1.6 
B3 4.44 1.5 4.27 1.6 
B4 4.64 1.6 4.13 1.7 
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Appendix F. Validity Measures after Dropping Items 
Table F1. Reliability, Validity, the Square Roots of AVEs (in Bold) and Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Construct 
(CR; AVE) 
BI TSUS TSEV RE UNC DOI IMI SW 
Mod 
RE 
CONT 
Mod 
IMI 
BI 
(0.96; 0.89) .94           
TSUS 
(0.82; 0.61) .38 .78          
TSEV 
(0.90; 0.82) .18 .47 .90         
RE 
(0.88; 0.71) .61 .45 .40 .84        
UNC 
(0.84; 0.64) -.37 -.03 .00 -.42 .80       
DOI 
(0.84; 0.73) .04 .12 -.13 -.25 .59 .86      
IMI 
(0.93; 0.81) .68 .37 .13 .56 -.24 .19 .90     
SW 
(.86;.68) .10 .21 .04 .06 .16 .20 .22 .82    
ModRE 
(0.93; 0.83) .46 .16 .10 .33 -.15 .08 .39 .15 .91   
CONT 
(0.97; 0.92) .41 .18 .10 .31 -.07 .11 .41 .24 .85 .96  
ModIMI 
(0.93; 0.83) .48 .25 .08 .23 .02 .32 .53 .36 .62 .67 .91 
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Table F2. Factor Loadings after Dropping Items 
Construct Item Loading 
Threat susceptibility 
TSUS1 .72 
TSUS2 .75 
TSUS3 .86 
Threat severity 
TSEV1 .89 
TSEV3 .92 
Response efficacy 
RE1 .87 
RE2 .89 
RE3 .76 
Perceived 
uncertainty 
UNC1 .80 
UNC3 .85 
UNC4 .74 
Discounting one’s 
own information 
DOI1 .90 
DOI2 .81 
Imitation 
IMI1 .90 
IMI2 .91 
IMI3 .89 
Switching costs 
SW1 .76 
SW2 .85 
SW3 .86 
Modified response efficacy 
ModRE1 .94 
ModRE2 .88 
ModRE3 .91 
Continuance intention 
CONT1 .95 
CONT2 .95 
CONT3 .98 
Modified imitation 
ModIMI1 .87 
ModIMI2 .93 
ModIMI3 .92 
Protection motivation 
B1 .94 
B2 .94 
B4 .95 
 
  
The Influence of Herd Behavior on Security Decisions 
457 
Appendix G. Effect Sizes for the Herd-Related Factors 
To calculate the effect sizes for the herd-related factors, we ran a partial model without these factors (only PMT 
constructs) and compared it with the full model (including both PMT and herd-related constructs) to assess the effect 
sizes, using Cohen’s ƒ² formula. As shown in Table G-1, the size of the effect of herd-related factors on protection 
motivation is medium (.29) for the treatment group, whereas it is small for the control group (0.04). Effect size (ƒ²) is 
calculated by the formula (R2 full – R2 partial) / (1 – R2 full). An effect size of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 as are defined as 
small, medium and large effect sizes respectively (Cohen 1988). 
 
Table G1. Effect Sizes 
Control group Treatment group 
Partial model R2 Full model R2 Effect size Partial model R2 Full model R2 Effect size 
.35 .39 .04 .39 .54 .32 
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Appendix H. Construct Development and Validation Results 
Table H1. Reliability Analysis 
Construct Alpha Square multiple correlation 
Modified response efficacy .93 
ModRE1 .79 
ModRE2 .73 
ModRE3 .76 
Modified imitation .93 
ModIMI1 .70 
ModIMI2 .78 
ModIMI3 .78 
 
Table H2. Response Efficacy vs. Modified Response Efficacy (PCA) 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
RE1  .88 
RE2  .91 
RE3  .85 
ModRE1 .94  
ModRE2 .92  
ModRE3 .93  
Notes: Values less than 0.4 are suppressed. Varimax rotation 
 
Table H3. Imitation vs. Modified Imitation (PCA) 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
IMI1  .90 
IMI2  .90 
IMI3  .91 
ModIMI1 .90  
ModIMI2 .91  
ModIMI3 .91  
Notes: Values less than 0.4 are suppressed. Varimax rotation 
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